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Abstract: In this short paper, I argue against what I call the “belonging to” interpretation of group 
selection in scenarios in which a group’s fitness is defined as the per capita reproductive output of 
the individuals of the group. According to this interpretation, group selection acts on “belonging to” 
properties of individuals, i.e. on relational or contextual properties that all the individuals of a group 
share simply by belonging to that group; thus, if differences in the individuals’ “belonging to” 
properties cause differences in their fitness, group selection sensu the “belonging to” interpretation 
is said to be at work. I argue that the main problem with the “belonging to” interpretation is that it 
confuses evolutionary changes due to differences in environmental quality with evolutionary 
changes due to selection. In other words, I argue that, in the majority of cases, this interpretation 
actually takes the “selection” out of the “group selection” notion it aims to interpret: by adopting 
this perspective, one implicitly commits to explaining the evolutionary change under consideration 
not by a kind of selection (be it individual or group selection), but by differences in the 
environmental quality experienced by individual types. 
 
 
 1. Introduction 
In this short paper, I argue against a particular interpretation of group selection that seems to 
be endorsed in a fraction of the multilevel selection literature. In multilevel selection theory, the 
evolution of certain traits – be they traits of cells, organisms, communities, species etc. – is 
explained by appealing to the idea that natural selection may simultaneously operate on at least two 
levels of biological organization. Multilevel selectionist explanations are often used with respect to 
the evolution of traits known as altruistic (e.g. Sober and Wilson 1998) or with respect to major 
evolutionary transitions (e.g. the evolution of multicellularity – Michod 1999). When just two levels 
are considered, the lower-level entities on which selection acts are usually called “individuals”, 
whereas the higher-level entities, within which individuals are nested, are referred to as “groups”. 
Thus, in any two-level selection scenario, “group selection” usually denotes the selection process 
taking place at the higher level of organization. It is customarily accepted that group selection may 
be of two kinds, depending on whether we consider a group as fitter than another one if it produces 
 2 
more offspring groups (this is usually called “multilevel selection 2” or MLS2) or if it has a higher 
output of individuals per individual member (this is usually referred to as “multilevel selection 1” or 
MLS1
1
; see Damuth and Heisler 1988; Mayo and Gillinsky 1987). 
My discussion here only concerns group selection of the latter kind: therefore, in the rest of 
this paper, the term group selection will refer to the MLS1 type. I will show (Section 2) that there 
are (at least) two manners in which this kind of group selection is interpreted in the literature: one is 
a proper “group-level interpretation,” while the other one is an individual-level interpretation 
according to which group selection acts on “belonging to” properties of individuals, where a 
“belonging to” property is a relational (or contextual) property that is shared by all the individual 
members of a group simply because they belong to that group. I will then go on to provide (in 
Section 3) a cascading argument against this “belonging to” interpretation. More precisely, I argue 
that, in the majority of cases, this interpretation actually takes the “selection” out of the “group 
selection” notion it aims to interpret: embracing this interpretation boils down to claiming that the 
evolutionary change under consideration results not from selection (at whatever level that may be), 
but from differences in the environmental quality encountered by the individual types of the focal 
population.  
Conceptual clarification of the “belonging to” interpretation is the main motivation behind 
my discussion here. And the conclusion of this clarification is that, by adopting the “belonging to” 
interpretation, one commits to a position that explains (part of) the focal evolutionary change not by 
selection (and implicitly not by group selection), but by differences in the environmental quality 
experienced by individuals. 
 
2. Two interpretations of group selection 
2.1. The group-level interpretation 
Imagine we have two groups (O and P) that vary with respect to a given group-level trait X, 
with group O having a higher value for X than group P. One way to analyze a case of this sort is to 
define a group’s fitness as the average fitness of the group’s individual members and to go on to 
determine whether the difference in group character between the groups causes a difference in 
fitness between them.
2
 Thus, if group O is fitter than group P due to its higher level of X, then our 
case is one of group selection. This encapsulates the group-level interpretation of group selection. 
                                                
1 My opinion is that the terms MLS1 and MLS2 should not be used in order to designate these two kinds of group 
selection and should be reserved for a different usage. However, since these terms are largely used in the literature in 
this sense, I will also adopt this terminology in this paper. 
2
 I adopt here a causal view of selection that is becoming increasingly popular among evolutionary theorists in general 
(e.g. Sober 1984; Shanahan 1990; Waters 2005; Glymour 2006, 2011; Godfrey-Smith 2007; Otsuka 2016), as well as 
among authors specifically working on multilevel selection (e.g. Arnold and Fristrup 1982; Okasha 2006; Jeler 2017). 
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Now suppose that the individuals of the two groups are of two types, where the types are 
distinguished only by their colour: half of the individuals are red, while the other half are grey. 
Moreover, suppose that the two groups of this toy example also vary with respect to the proportion 
of types they contain, with group O containing more grey individuals than group P. Given that grey 
individuals are better represented in the fitter group O, they will increase in frequency as an indirect 
result of group-level selection on X.
3
 
This verdict may seem somewhat counterintuitive. Indeed, one individual type is said to 
increase in frequency due to selection on the group-level trait X, but this group-level selection is 
based on a notion of group fitness that is itself mathematically dependent on the fitnesses of 
individuals. In other words, the verdict states that certain individuals receive a boost in fitness – and 
therefore in frequency – because of a group-level differential fitness that is itself defined by 
appealing to individual fitness. 
The reply to this worry is that the counterintuitiveness may be allayed if we consider the 
cases where group selectionist explanations are most compelling. Okasha (2016) has convincingly 
argued that, in certain cases, group selectionist explanations are preferable to kin selectionist ones 
because the former kind of explanation captures the direct causal influences between the salient 
variables, whereas the latter kind of explanation – though not flawed – uses variables that are only 
indirectly causally connected. The specific cases Okasha has in mind are those in which it is the 
group “that has a fitness value in the first instance,” whereas the individual fitness is only 
“derivative” (Okasha 2016, 455); the most straightforward examples – but probably not the only 
ones – are cases in which the groups in question exhibit reproductive division of labor (this is, for 
example, the case of eusocial insects where only a minority of organisms does the reproducing for 
the entire colony, or of multicellular organisms in which somatic cells have no access to the germ 
line etc.). In this kind of cases, a given group-level trait may very well fully determine the 
reproductive success of the whole group
4
, and the per capita reproductive output of the individuals 
of the group – e.g. the average number of copies left by the alleles at a given locus – only depends 
on how the total reproductive output of the group is shared among its members. In such cases, 
claiming that a given individual-level trait may spread because of selection on a group-level trait is 
no longer counterintuitive. But let me also emphasize that the issue of how to interpret the notion of 
group selection and the issue of when group selectionist explanations are preferable to other kinds 
of explanation are two theoretically decoupled issues and my interest in this paper lies with the 
former, rather than the latter. 
                                                
3
 Throughout this paper, I assume that individuals faithfully transmit their type to their offspring. 
4 The trait may be, for example, the degree of reproductive competition in certain ant species, where an overabundance 
of egg-laying workers leads to a lack of workers taking care of the brood (Hölldobler and Wilson 2009). 
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The main characteristics of the group-level interpretation may thus be summarized as 
follows: 
a) it sees “group selection” as acting on a group-level property. The groups themselves are 
under selection here, even though a group’s fitness is definitionally dependent on the 
fitnesses of its individual members; 
b) individual types change in frequency as a result of selection at the higher level. There is, 
therefore, a presumed “vertical” effect of group selection on the frequencies of individual 
types. 
Let us briefly add that the list of publications endorsing the “group-level interpretation” of 
group selection includes: Wilson (1975, 1989), Sober (1984), Sober and Wilson (1998), Michod 
(1999). 
 
2.2. The “belonging to” interpretation 
 But there is a second way in which the above toy scenario could be interpreted. A few steps 
need to be taken for this: 
i) First, we assign a relational or a “belonging to” property to each individual of our case, depending 
on the value for X of the group it belongs to. More precisely, all the individuals in group O will 
have the same value for this “belonging to” variable and this value will be equal to XO , i.e. to the 
level of X of group O. Similarly, the value of this “belonging to” variable for each individual in 
group P will be equal to XP. 
ii) We then determine whether having a “belonging to” property whose value is equal to XO 
increases an individual’s fitness with respect to other individuals in the population (in our case, with 
respect to individuals with an XP value for their “belonging to” property). 
iii) If it does, then we have “group selection” here sensu the “belonging to” interpretation. 
Furthermore, we can now note that there is a correlation in our population between 
individual color and the value for the “belonging to” variable: most of the grey individuals of the 
population have a “belonging to” variable equal to XO, whereas most of the red individuals have a 
lower value for their “belonging to” variable, namely XP.
5
 As a consequence, because there is a 
correlation between “greyness” and higher value for the “belonging to” variable, grey individuals 
will increase in frequency in the global population as an indirect result of selection on the 
“belonging to” properties of individuals. 
To sum up, the main characteristics of the “belonging to” interpretation are the following: 
                                                
5
 Whether this correlation is spurious or not will only become relevant later on. 
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a) it sees “group selection” as acting on an individual-level property. It is the individuals that 
are under selection here, even though the manner in which we assign a value for the 
“belonging to” property of individuals is dependent on the relevant group-level property; 
b) individual types change in frequency as a result of selection at their own (individual) level. 
There is, therefore, a presumed “horizontal” effect of group selection on the frequencies of 
individual types, just like in any case in which two associated organism-level traits spread 
together even when selection is only acting on one of them. 
Before we go on to criticize this “belonging to” interpretation, we should first ask ourselves 
whether there are authors who do endorse it. What seems to be the most clear-cut endorsement of 
this interpretation is found in the seminal paper that has put forth the distinction between multilevel 
selection of the MLS1 and MLS2 kinds, namely Damuth and Heisler (1988). Here is how they 
present MLS1: 
In multilevel selection [1]: 
(1) “Group selection” refers to the effects of group membership on individual fitness. 
(2) Fitnesses are properties of individuals. 
(3) Characters are values attributed to individuals (including both individual and contextual 
characters) (Damuth and Heisler 1988, 410). 
 
 The crucial elements of the “belonging to” interpretation are all here. Damuth and Heisler 
stress that it is to the individuals that the characters relevant for selection are attributed, and this 
includes “contextual” characters. A few pages later they clarify what they mean by such characters 
by saying that “any character of the group to which an individual belongs, including group means or 
frequencies, can be formally assigned to that individual as a result of its membership in the group; 
such a character becomes a contextual character of that individual, and its value is identical for all 
members of the group” (ibid., 417-418). Thus, contextual characters are attributed to individuals, 
their value is dependent on the value of the group characters and is thus identical for all the 
individuals of the group: these are exactly our “belonging to” properties. Moreover, Damuth and 
Heisler also stress that the relevant fitnesses are properties of individuals. In other words, selection 
here refers to differences in individual fitness that are due to differences in values of the “belonging 
to” properties of individuals, or, as they put it, group selection of the MLS1 kind “refers to the 
effects of group membership on individual fitness.” Whether or not we should read the quoted 
fragment from Damuth and Heisler as an attempt to outline a particular interpretation of group 
selection is unclear. But, if we do read it in this way, it would be difficult to find a clearer 
endorsement of the “belonging to” interpretation in the literature than the one from their highly 
influential article.
6
 
                                                
6 There are, however, some phrases in this article that seem to gesture towards an endorsement of the “group-level 
interpretation.” For example, when they speak of group selection of the MLS2 kind, Heisler and Damuth (1988, 410) 
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 A less clear-cut endorsement of the “belonging to” interpretation is found in Evolution and 
the Levels of Selection, Samir Okasha’s 2006 book that has set the tone for philosophical 
discussions of multilevel selection in recent years. Precisely because it is less clear-cut, discussing 
this case requires some background information and more extensive quoting. First, let us recall that, 
in a parallel paper to the one quoted above, Heisler and Damuth (1987) had proposed “contextual 
analysis” as a statistical method for analyzing multilevel selection scenarios of the MLS1 kind. This 
method consisted in extending the multiple regression technique for the analysis of selection on 
multiple correlated characters developed by Lande and Arnold (1983) so that it could also 
accommodate contextual characters, i.e. relational characters that the individuals posses simply by 
belonging to a given group (in our terms: “belonging to” characters). As Heisler and Damuth (1987, 
588) state, in contextual analysis, contextual characters “are quantifiable group properties treated as 
individual traits. Thus, a contextual character is a component of an individual’s phenotype that is 
shared identically by all members of a particular group.” It is therefore highly likely that Damuth 
and Heisler’s (1988) apparent endorsement of the “belonging to” stems from their preference for 
contextual analysis as a method for analyzing multilevel selection scenarios (more on this below).
7
 
 Okasha (2006) picks up where Heisler and Damuth (1987) left off. His discussion starts by 
unambiguously stating that one of the essential features of MLS1 is that “collective [= group] 
fitness is defined as average particle [= individual] fitness” (Okasha 2006, 85); similarly, he states 
that Wislon’s (1975) trait-group model for the evolution of altruism is an example of MLS1 
scenario (Okasha 2006, 56) in that it “treats groups as fitness-bearing entities” (57). Moreover, just 
like I do here, he endorses a strictly causal view of natural selection according to which we are 
dealing with selection when a character “causally influences fitness,” which is more precisely 
expressed by saying that “differences in the character cause fitness differences” (Okasha 2006, 76). 
By putting these two elements together, we get a picture that is fairly similar to the group-level 
                                                                                                                                                            
state: “In this case, we have identified a different kind of fitness than in the first [i.e. than in the MLS1 case], a group-
level fitness that is not simply the mean of the fitnesses of the group’s members,” which suggests that the relevant 
fitness for MLS1 is the mean fitness of a group, as in the “group-level interpretation” presented above. 
7
 Without dwelling on its details here, let me recall that, in MLS1 scenarios, contextual analysis allows us to partition 
the population average change in an individual-level character z in the following manner: 
w
YzCov
w
zVar
z
jijYijz ),()( ββ
+=∆ , where ijz is the character of the i
th individual in the jth group, jY is the group 
character of the jth group, w is the average individual fitness in the global population, zβ is the partial regression 
coefficient of individual fitness on individual character and Yβ is the partial regression coefficient of individual fitness 
on group character. In cases in which the relevant group character is defined as the average character of its individual 
members, the equation becomes 
w
ZzCov
w
zVar
z
jijZijz ),()( ββ
+=∆ , where jZ  is the average individual character in 
the j
th
 group. In the latter kind of cases, a different partition is provided by Price’s (1972) hierarchical equation, namely: 
[ ]
w
WZCov
w
wzCovE
z
jjijij ),(),(
+=∆ , where ijw is the fitness of the i
th
 individual in the j
th
 group and jW  is the average 
fitness of the individuals of the jth group. Heisler and Damuth (1987) argue for the superiority of the contextual analysis 
partition over that of Price’s equation. 
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interpretation discussed above: if a difference in group character causes a difference in group fitness 
(defined in the MLS1 way, as average fitness of the groups’ members), then we have group 
selection. So when Okasha moves on and discusses the discrepancies between Price’s equation and 
contextual analysis, his discussion should try to determine which one is better at isolating the effects 
of group selection on the change in the focal individual-level trait: in Okasha’s (2006, 94) terms, 
which of the two equations indicated above provides a more accurate “causal decomposition” of the 
evolutionary change.  
However, as his discussion progresses, and for reasons that I will not dwell on here
8
, Okasha 
is lead to argue that Price’s equation and contextual analysis are not merely two ways of 
partitioning the evolutionary change, but that they represent two different “approaches” to MLS1 
or, in his own terms, “they embody conflicting conceptions of multi-level selection” (Okasha 2006, 
94). This blurs the distinction between contextual analysis as a mere instrument for measuring the 
effects of group selection (however the latter may be construed) and the contextual “approach” as a 
conception regarding what group selection is.
9
 So when, for example, following Heisler and 
Damuth (1987), Okasha (2006, 86) states that “The basic idea [of contextual analysis] is to regard a 
collective’s character as a ‘contextual’ character of each particle in the collective,” it is no longer 
certain whether this is seen just as a formal convention useful for purposes of measuring the effects 
of group selection or whether this is taken to operate a substantial modification of the notion itself 
of group selection. Moreover, towards the end of his discussion on this, Okasha (2006, 93) does 
state that “contextual analysis is intrinsically reductionistic” in that it “treats the collectives [= the 
groups] as part of their [the individuals’] fitness-affecting environments.” This is precisely the 
perspective assumed by the “belonging to” interpretation: the groups are not themselves under 
selection, they just provide the different environments or contexts over which an essentially 
individual-level type of selection is operating. 
To sum up, I would say that it is unclear whether Okasha (2006) does indeed endorse the 
“belonging to” interpretation, but there are enough elements that might lead readers into thinking 
that such an endorsement is found therein. 
Another apparent endorsement of the “belonging to” interpretation is found in Glymour 
(2008), the article from which I have borrowed the term “belonging to” property. Glymour 
introduces it by saying that “belonging to” properties are “surrogates for distinct but definitionally 
related ‘group-level’ variables; because these surrogates are defined for individuals, they can be 
                                                
8 One of these reasons is certainly the fact that “contextual analysis” detects a group selection component in cases of 
“soft selection,” i.e. cases in which, overall, groups do not vary in fitness, yet the fitnesses of individuals are influenced 
by their group’s character. For some recent attempts to solve this thorny issue, see Goodnight (2013) and Bourrat 
(2016). 
9 Indeed, I suspect that Damuth and Heisler’s (1988) failure to acknowledge this distinction has occasioned their above-
detailed apparent endorsement of the “belonging to” interpretation. 
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used in a causal or a statistical analysis in which the individual is the unit of analysis” (Glymour 
2008, 836). These surrogate “belonging to” properties could thus be seen as convenient notational 
instruments for tracking the effects of group selection on the frequencies or average values of 
individual-level traits. In any case, using such surrogate “belonging to” properties does not seem to 
necessarily commit one to an interpretation about whether group selection acts on a group-level 
property or whether it acts on “belonging to” properties of individuals. However, as Glymour’s 
discussion goes on, he does seem to commit to the latter position and he ends up explicitly stating 
that “group selection acts whenever belonging to properties causally influence reproductive 
success” (Glymour 2008, 844). Though not lacking in ambiguity, I take Glymour’s discussion to 
constitute a fairly clear endorsement of the “belonging to” interpretation. But, interestingly, 
Glymour is very critical of contextual analysis and this shows that one can endorse the “belonging 
to” interpretation without also endorsing contextual analysis as a method for analyzing group 
selection. 
 
3. A cascading argument against the “belonging to” interpretation 
Before we ask whether group selection may be said to act on “belonging to” properties of 
individuals, we should first ask whether natural selection in general – at whatever level – may act 
on properties of this sort. The answer to this latter question has to be negative: seeing natural 
selection in general as acting on “belonging to” properties would lead us to confuse evolutionary 
changes due to differences in environment with evolutionary consequences of selection. 
To see this, let us look at an example similar to one from Brandon (1990). Imagine a 
population of organisms spread over two environments that vary in quality (one is good for the 
organisms in question, the other one is poor). In a case of this sort, belonging to the better 
environment does boost one’s fitness with respect to organisms belonging to the poor environment: 
we would thus have to conclude that there is selection on the “belonging to” properties of organisms 
here. So, instead of drawing the intuitive conclusion that any evolutionary consequences that may 
arise here are simply due to differences in the environments encountered, by appealing to 
“belonging to” properties we would have to claim that these consequences stem from selection. In 
Brandon’s (1990, 64) terms, we thus confuse “survival of the fittest” with “survival of the luckiest.” 
This example is not a singular one. Indeed, if we were to embrace the idea that selection 
may act on “belonging to” properties of biological entities, we would be hard pressed to find any 
subsisting example of evolution due to chance. Even the classical example of lightning strikes 
would turn into a selection example: “belonging to” the set of organisms struck by lightning bolts 
does cause one’s fitness to drop, therefore selection on this “belonging to” property is acting; the 
evolutionary changes due to lightning strikes would thus become consequences of selection. Any 
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obvious example of evolution due to chance becomes a case of natural selection once we adopt the 
idea that selection may act on “belonging to” properties: I presume this is something most 
philosophers and – probably to a greater extent – most biologists would want to avoid. 
Someone could agree that natural selection in general should not be seen as acting on 
“belonging to” properties, but still contend that such properties may nonetheless be used in multi-
level selection theory, and more specifically in cases in which individuals possessing such traits 
“belong to” genuine groups (exactly how such groups should be identified and demarcated is an 
issue I will not tackle here
10
). In order to asses this possibility, let us begin by looking at a 
hypothetical toy example in which two groups (A and B) vary with respect to a given group-level 
property like density
11
 and the average individual fitness in group A is higher due to the group’s 
higher density; let us further suppose, for the time being, that a group’s density does not depend in 
any way on the traits of its individual members. 
Looking at this toy case from the perspective of the group-level interpretation, we may say 
that if group A outreproduces group B because of its higher density, then group-level selection is 
operating. But when we look at the case from an individual perspective – as the “belonging to” 
interpretation demands us to –, we have to say that the individuals in group A just happen to 
encounter living conditions that include a higher density, and they have, on average, a higher fitness 
as a consequence. We thus admit that some individuals of the global population happen to be 
distributed in the better environment, whereas the others are distributed in the poorer environment. 
There is no substantial difference between this case and the Brandon-like case discussed above: 
claiming that we are dealing with selection here because differences in “belonging to” properties of 
individuals cause differences in fitness between them is just as problematic here as it was there. 
Thus, claiming that, in this case, selection acts on “belonging to” properties again comes down to 
confusing “survival of the fittest” with “survival of the luckiest”. 
To put it otherwise, this sort of case may be seen as a case of “selection” only when we look 
at it from a group-level perspective (and we thus take a difference in a group-level trait – density – 
to cause a difference in group fitness between the two groups). When we look at the exact same 
case from the individuals’ perspective, it becomes a case of evolution due to differences in 
environment: some individuals encounter better living conditions than others and this in no way 
depends on the traits of these individuals. It follows that one may still adopt an individual-level 
perspective with respect to this case: however, if one does adopt it, one should not claim that the 
evolutionary change in this case is a consequence of selection of any sort (be it “group” or 
                                                
10
 For detailed treatments of this issue, see Sober (1984), Okasha (2006), Godfrey-Smith (2008) and Glymour (2017). 
11 I use density as the group character of interest because, as Damuth and Heisler (1988) note, this is a property that 
cannot be measured at the level of individuals. 
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“individual” selection); rather, one should state that it is just a consequence of the uneven 
distribution of types into environments of different quality. 
One might object that in many cases individuals do not just happen to belong to the group 
they are in: often there are biological reasons for their belonging to one group or another. This is 
correct and it will help us distinguish more clearly between cases of evolution due to differences in 
environment and cases involving selection. To see this, let us compare the following two versions 
of our case: 
a) First, let us suppose that group density is stable across multiple generations and that there 
is a reason why the individuals of the higher-density group A are in that group, namely they were 
born in it. But note that, in this modified case, the important factors remain as in the previous one: 
an individual in group A experiences a more favorable social environment (i.e. a higher group 
density) than an individual in group B, but this difference in social environment is in no way due to 
a difference in these individuals’ traits. Therefore, saying that there is selection on “belonging to” 
properties here is tantamount to saying that there is selection for the relevant living conditions 
encountered by the individuals (here, selection for the density encountered). Therefore, even in 
cases in which there is a reason (e.g. ancestry) why individuals are found in the groups they belong 
to, adopting a “belonging to” interpretation with respect to such a case would again lead us to take 
evolutionary changes due to differences in environmental quality to be evolutionary consequences 
of selection. 
b) Now let us suppose that the individuals that end up in group A do so because they prefer 
groups with a higher density. Their belonging to that group thus occurs not by chance, nor by birth, 
but by choice. In this modified case, saying that selection acts on the “belonging to” properties of 
the individuals seems legitimate, given that the difference in the individuals’ “belonging to” 
properties is a result of a difference in their density preferences or, more generally, in their 
preferences for particular social environments. But this also means that here the “belonging to” 
properties of individuals are caused by – and their values simply reflect – these individuals’ social 
environment preferences. However, these preferences are prima facie much more entitled to be 
considered phenotypic traits than are “belonging to” properties, mainly because the former are 
intrinsic properties of individuals, whereas “belonging to” properties are strictly relational ones 
(indeed, there are authors who claim that only intrinsic properties of biological entities may be 
considered phenotypic traits on which natural selection acts – e.g. Godfrey-Smith 2009). Therefore, 
in this sort of case, instead of appealing to “belonging to” properties, it is much more 
straightforward to say that selection acts on the preferences of individuals for certain social 
environments (Brandon 1990).  
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The take-away point from this discussion is that we dealing with “evolution due to 
differences in environment” when the difference in living conditions (here, in social environment or 
density) that the individuals encounter is not due to a difference in trait between these individuals. 
On the other hand, we are dealing with selection when the difference in the living conditions 
encountered is due to a difference in individual trait (here, in density preferences); however, in such 
cases, it is much more straightforward to claim that selection acts on that individual trait (i.e. on 
density preferences), rather than on the “belonging to” properties that derive from it. 
One might agree with this argument, but claim that it only narrows down the applicability 
range of the “belonging to” interpretation: if the latter is problematic when there is no dependency 
relation between the relevant group trait and the individual traits of the group’s members, then it 
might well work when such dependencies (be they causal or definitional) are in place. 
But this last refuge does not succeed in saving the “belonging to” interpretation either. To 
see this, let us again imagine that two groups differ with respect to their value for a trait Y that is 
causally or definitionally dependent on the trait y of the individuals that make up the groups. 
Therefore, a group has a high value for Y because it mostly contains individuals possessing trait y. 
Here, one may argue that an individual that belongs to the group with a higher Y will benefit from 
the better living conditions ensured by the higher Y not by accident, but because it will have itself 
contributed to the bringing about of these better living conditions (i.e. of the higher Y). The problem 
with this argument, though, is that it fails to notice that that individual’s trait is only responsible for 
a fraction of the living conditions that that individual encounters, while most of these living 
conditions depend on the traits of the other members of the individual’s group. If, again, we 
compare two individuals from the two groups, we will have to conclude that a fraction of the 
difference in living conditions they encounter may be due to a difference in trait y between the two 
individuals, but that most of the difference between their living conditions is due to the difference in 
the social environment they encounter. So, just like with respect to density above, we must inquire 
about the source of this difference in social environment: is it due to a difference in trait between 
the two individuals or not? And, depending on the answer to this question, we again have two 
possibilities: 
a) If the difference in social environment is not due to a difference in trait between 
individuals, saying that there is selection on “belonging to” properties here is tantamount to saying 
that there is selection for the living conditions encountered by the individuals. This, however, is just 
as problematic as in the cases discussed above. It is important to stress that this point holds even for 
what is probably the most common and the most relevant kind of case for the evolution of social 
behavior, namely the type of case in which certain factors (e.g. limited dispersal) ensure that groups 
are mainly composed of genetically related individuals. In such cases, again, there is an underlying 
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reason for the correlation between individual trait y and the group trait Y (i.e. for the fact that most 
individuals possessing y are clumped into one group and most individuals that do not posses y are 
found in the other group), and that reason is the common ancestry of the members of each group. 
But, as discussed above with respect to the density case, this is not sufficient for legitimizing the 
idea that there is selection on “belonging to” properties: it is not sufficient that there be a cause for 
the difference in the social environment encountered by two individuals from different groups; what 
is required is that this difference itself be the result of a difference in trait between these two 
individuals. And, because this requirement is not met here, claiming that there is selection for 
“belonging to” properties in cases with limited dispersal is, again, tantamount to claiming that there 
is selection for the quality of the environment encountered by the individuals.
12
 
b) On the other hand, the difference in the social environment experienced might be due to a 
difference in trait between individuals if, for example, individuals of one type prefer to assort with 
their own kind. Here, just like in version b) of the density case above, most individuals possessing y 
are found in the same group (that consequently has a higher Y) not by chance, nor by birth, but by 
preference. But this assortative preference is, of course, just another form of preference for a 
particular social environment and what I said above about the latter holds here as well: selection 
may indeed be said to act on “belonging to” properties here, but it is much more straightforward to 
claim that selection acts on the assortative preferences themselves, rather than on the “belonging to” 
properties that derive from them. 
To sum up, claiming that there is selection on “belonging to” properties seems legitimate 
only in cases in which the difference in the social environment encountered by individuals is due to 
a difference in trait between these individuals, as is the case, for example, when individuals exhibit 
preferences for certain kinds of social environment; however, in these cases, it makes more sense to 
                                                
12 It is crucial to stress that the kind of argument I am making here against the “belonging to” interpretation in 
populations with limited dispersal does not apply to kin selection theory. Like the “belonging to” interpretation, kin 
selection approaches do distinguish between two components of individual fitness, namely direct fitness, on one side, 
and, on the other side, indirect fitness (in the inclusive fitness approach) or the fitness benefit brought to the focal 
individual by genetically similar individuals (in the neighbor-modulated fitness approach). However, and this is the 
crucial difference, unlike the “belonging to” interpretation, kin selection approaches do not claim that the two 
components of fitness correspond to two different selection processes (namely, individual selection on the relevant 
individual trait, on one side, and selection on “belonging to” properties, one the other). On the contrary, when one says 
that a particular trait/behavior spreads by kin selection, this means that the combined effects of the two components of 
fitness lead to an increase in frequency of that trait/behavior. To put it otherwise, even though one may separate the 
components of fitness of each individual at a given moment (e.g. into direct and indirect fitness, in the inclusive fitness 
approach), it is the sum of these components that is taken as the fitness notion corresponding to the process of (kin) 
selection for the focal trait/behavior of that individual. It is this extension of the notion of fitness that constitutes the 
distinguishing feature of kin selection theory (see Marshall 2015). Indeed, Hamilton (1964, 8) is explicit about this: 
“Just as in the sense of classical selection we may consider whether a given character expressed in an individual is 
adaptive in the sense of being in the interest of his personal fitness or not, so in the present sense of selection we may 
consider whether the character or trait of behaviour is or is not adaptive in the sense of being in the interest of his 
inclusive fitness.” 
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claim that selection acts precisely on these preferences of individuals, rather than on the “belonging 
to” properties deriving from them.  
In contrast, note that the group-level interpretation has no problem accommodating the 
above-discussed toy cases
13
. If two groups differ in fitness due to a given group-level trait (that may 
or may not depend on the traits of the groups’ members), then group selection sensu the group-level 
interpretation may be said to act, and this irrespective of whether the uneven distribution of 
individual types into groups is accidental or is due to descent or social environment preferences. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this short paper, I argued against the “belonging to” interpretation of MLS1 group 
selection that is endorsed – or, at least, seems to be endorsed – in a fraction of the multilevel 
selection literature. I argued that, in a minority of cases (when the individuals’ belonging to their 
group is due to their preferences for certain social environments), this interpretation might be more 
sensibly replaced with the idea of selection for these preferences of individuals. However, in the 
majority of cases, the “belonging to” interpretation takes the “selection” out of the “group 
selection” notion it intends to interpret: by adopting this perspective with respect to a given 
scenario, one implicitly commits to explaining the evolutionary change therein not by a kind of 
selection (be it individual or group selection), but by differences in the environmental quality 
experienced by individual types. 
On the other hand, I pointed out that the arguments given here against the “belonging to” 
interpretation do not affect the group-level interpretation of group selection. This suggests that, if 
we want multilevel selection theory to be a theory about selection, endorsing the group-level 
interpretation of group selection is a suitable option. 
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